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I. INTRODUCTION
L EGAL RULES governing international aviation owe their or-
igin to the efforts of governments in the 1920s "to create a
uniform legal regime, and shield carriers from potentially devas-
tating aviation disaster damage awards."' In 1925, delegates
held the First International Conference of Private Air Law in
Paris in 1925. Four years later, the delegates from twenty-two
nations met in Warsaw, Poland, to consider the proposal of an
organization known as Comit6 International Technique
d'ExpertsJuridique Aeriens ("CITEJA"), established at the Paris
conference.2 In Warsaw, the delegates adopted the Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, commonly known as the Warsaw
Convention.'
The major areas in which the Warsaw Convention brought
uniformity have been described to be (1) the definition of inter-
national carriage; (2) the documents of carriage; (3) the regime
of liability; and (4) jurisdiction.' All but the first factor are still
active, and at times even subject to heated debate. This paper
focuses on the last area, not so much on the current controver-
I Paul Stephen Dempsey, Pennies from Heaven: Breaking Through the Liability Ceil-
ings of Warsaw, 22 ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE LAW 267, 268 (1997).
2 See id.
3 See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C.
§ 40105 (1994) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention or Convention].
4 See Michael Milde, "Warsaw" System and Limits of Liability-Yet Another Cross-
road?, 18 ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE LAw 201, 204-06 (1993).
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sies concerning jurisdiction, but rather on a relatively new
scheme; namely the ramifications that the Internet has on the
Convention's jurisdictional clause. Leaving the domestic side to
the Department of Transportation (the "DOT"), this paper will
only focus on the international aspects, which are governed by
the Convention.'
Of the four original jurisdictions under Article 28(1) of the
Convention, the one that seems to give rise to the most interpre-
tative difficulties today is the place where the carrier "has a place
of business through which the contract of transportation has
been made."6 These interpretative problems promise to esca-
late with the increased use of Internet ticketing (either through
the airline's Internet homepage or through a travel agent's
homepage), because: (1) the place of business through which
the contract has been made is not clear; and (2) the issue of
contract formation must be examined in the context of the In-
ternet. Additionally, this contract-related jurisdiction is proba-
bly the only one of the four under Article 28 that might cause
problems in a setting where an airline ticket has been bought
through the Internet.
The first factor that makes the issue especially timely and in-
teresting is the fact that the number of Internet users and the
amount of commerce done over the Internet is rapidly increas-
ing. According to the U.S. Government's Electronic Commerce
Working Group,7 the number of Internet users in December
1995 (when the Working Group first convened) was fewer than
10 million people. Commerce on the Internet was just begin-
ning, and its potential was not widely recognized at that time.
Nineteen months later, in July 1997, the Clinton Administration
released "A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce" (the
5 The U.S. DOT's Show Cause Order (Order 96-10-7) confirmed the U.S. car-
riers' agreement to adopt the fifth forum disapproving of the LATA-Intercarrier
Agreement's failure to include that jurisdiction. This caused a controversy be-
tween the DOT and IATA.
6 49 U.S.C. § 40105. Especially the two different wordings of the paragraph in
the English version and in the French version, as well as the wide interpretation
received by the term 'establishment', have caused controversy. See, e.g., GEOR-
GET E MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 304-308 (1977); ELMAR
GIEMULLA ET AL., WARSAW CONVENTION COMMENTARY 28/12-24 (1992 & Supp. 7
1997); RENE H. MANKiEWICZ, THE LIABILITY REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIR
CARRIER 136-137 (1981). See infra notes 39-67 and accompanying text.
7 See United States Dept. of Commerce Working Group on Electronic Commerce, U.S.
GOVERNMENT WORKING GROUP ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT
(1998).
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"Framework"), placing electronic commerce on the global eco-
nomic agenda. By that time, over 50 million people were con-
nected to the Internet and many private sources predicted that
commerce on the Internet would total tens of billions of dollars
by the turn of the century. In November 1998, the number of
people connected to the Internet had grown to 140 million.8
In April 1998, the U.S. Department of Commerce, in coopera-
tion with the Electronic Commerce Working Group, issued the
first comprehensive report on the economic impact of informa-
tion technology industries and electronic commerce. Due in
part to the growth in the Internet, information technology in-
dustries have accounted for over one-third of the real growth in
the U.S. gross domestic product over the past three years.9 Vir-
tually all sectors of the economy are being affected. By the year
2002, 8 to 10 percent of all airline tickets purchased in the
United States are likely to be sold online. 10
The second interesting factor is the 1975 Guatemala City Pro-
tocol 1 that created the so-called "fifth jurisdiction,"1 2 which
would permit air passengers to maintain personal injury damage
claims in their country of domicile or permanent residence pro-
vided that the carrier also has an "establishment" there." There
are also related current proposals advanced both by independ-
8 See id. at 1.
9 See id.
10 See id. at 2. It is possible that this number is an underestimation, because
airlines are making increased efforts to lead their customers to their Internet
sites. In contrast to traditional ticket sales, online purchases cost much less, labor
costs are minor, and there are no travel agent commissions or computer-reserva-
tion-system fees. See, e.g., Nancy Fonti, Airlines Aim to Reroute Ticket Buyers to the
Web, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1999, at B3F.
I1 See International Civil Aviation Organization: Protocol Revising Warsaw Con-
vention Rules on Air Carrier Liability to Passengers, Mar. 8, 1971, 64 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 613 (Apr. 26, 1971) [hereinafter Guatemala City Protocol].
12 See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Car-
riage by Air, signed at Montreal on 28 May 1999, [hereinafter New Convention],
will, when ratified, modernize and consolidate the Warsaw Convention in many
respects. One of the changes compared to the Warsaw Convention is the accept-
ance of the fifth jurisdiction (the text of the pertinent part of the New Conven-
tion can be found under footnote 24). This New Convention will take effect on
the 30th instrument of ratification. Hence, the discussion here is based mostly
on the Convention and its Article 28.
13 The argument in favor of providing for the passenger's domicile as an addi-
tional forum is that it would be available in the absence of the Warsaw Conven-
tion under general principles of private international law.
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ent commentators14 as well as governmental bodies. 15 The prac-
tical effect of adding the "fifth jurisdiction" would not be a
significant one.16 Notwithstanding this, the discussion on the
topic and the proposals to add a "fifth jurisdiction" either on a
treaty, legislative, or contractual level should be taken into con-
sideration when the interpretation of the already existing four
jurisdictions is contemplated in the electronic context.
In this paper, the jurisdictional issues of the Convention (Part
II) and the necessary Internet related issues such as the In-
ternet's general features and jurisdiction in the Internet (Parts
III-IV) are discussed first, in order to lay out the framework in
which the study will be done. Before the actual analysis and an
application of the Internet related issues to the Warsaw Conven-
tion regime in Part VI, the formation of contracts is scrutinized
in Part V (first concerning contracts of carriage, and then in the
context of the Internet) in order to clarify the key ingredients
on which the analysis will be based. In Part VI, the two ele-
ments, the Convention and the Internet, are combined and ana-
lyzed, first in a case in which the ticket was purchased directly
from the airline's Internet page, and then in a case where the
purchase was made from a travel agent's Internet site. The re-
sult is one that takes a positive stance toward a loose interpreta-
tion of Article 28.
14 See generally Bin Cheng, A Fifth Jurisdiction Without Montreal Additional Protocol
No. 3, and Full Compensation Without the Supplemental Compensation Plan, 20 AIR &
SPACE LAw 118 (1995); Warren L. Dean, Jr., Restructuring the Warsaw Right to Re-
cover, Address at the 30th Annual Southern Methodist University Air Law Sympo-
sium (Feb. 29, 1996); Allan I. Mendelsohn, Warsaw: In Transition or Decline?, 21
AIR & SPACE LAW 183 (1996); News from International Organizations: Report on ICAO
Legal Activities in 1995/1996, 21 AIR & SPACE LAw 295, 297 (1996); Peter Martin,
The 1995 IATA Intercarrier Agreement: An Update, 21 AIR & SPACE LAw 126 (1996).
15 The European Union has also recognized the need for the fifth jurisdiction.
See Article 7 in the proposal to Council regulation of 20 Dec. 1995. However,
Article 7 of the Commission's amended proposal was deleted in the Common
Position (EC) No 16/97 (see Official Journal No. C 123, 21/04/1997) since it was
"deemed to raise very complex legal and factual issues which would have to be
resolved before settling the claim". Hence, the 'fifth jurisdiction' does not ap-
pear in the Council Regulation (EC) No. 2027/97 of 9 October 1997 on air car-
rier liability in the event of accidents.
16 From the U.S. point of view, the fifth jurisdiction would come into operation
only if the carrier has an establishment (i.e., a place of business, even if only an
agency-see Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 360 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1966) and discus-
sion below) in the United States, even if the passenger who is ordinarily or per-
manently resident in the United States has not bought his or her ticket through
that establishment. See Cheng, supra note 14, at 119-20.
20001 457
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
II. THE WARSAW CONVENTION'S
JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS
A. JUDIcL DEFINITION OF THE PLACE OF ARTICLE 28
WITHIN EACH SYSTEM
The question of whether the four possible jurisdictions refer
to a country or places within a particular country has not been
uniformly agreed upon. In the United States, the fora listed in
Article 28(1) have been held to refer to the national territory of
a High Contracting Party.
In Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 7 the passenger, a New
Jersey resident, was killed in an accident in Japan (his destina-
tion) while on an aircraft owned and operated by a carrier domi-
ciled in Delaware with a principal place of business in
California. The ticket had been purchased in the carrier's Cali-
fornia office. The family brought suit in New York, a place that
appeared to satisfy none of the criteria of Article 28. The court
held that the basic unit of international law is a country and not
the areas or subdivisions of nations."' Therefore, the suit could
be filed anywhere in the U.S., and thus New York was a valid
jurisdiction.
The British version of Article 28 is different from the Ameri-
can translation. However, the British take the same approach as
the Americans, i.e., Article 28 has been considered to refer to
the national territory, not an area within the territory.19
An example of a country that sees Article 28 as a provision
limiting jurisdiction to a certain area or subdivision within its
territory is France. In France, the special provisions of Article
28 simply replace the provisions of Article 14 and 15 of the Civil
Code normally giving jurisdiction to French courts whenever a
17 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965).
18 See id. at 855.
19 See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW CASES AND MATERIALS § 22 at 7-46
n. 2 b (2d ed. 1981) (quoting English case Rotterdamshe Bank N.V. v. British
Overseas Airways Corp., [1953] All E.R. 675 (Q.B.)).
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French citizen is involved in a suit.2 0 A similar view has been
adopted in Italy. 1
For the purposes of this paper, Article 28 will be treated ac-
cording to the American interpretation as assigning jurisdiction
to a High Contracting Party only and nothing more. The reason
for this is the mainly American angle of observation,22 and also
the fact that the Internet complicates the possible ramifications.
B. PARTIcuLAR GROUNDS OF JURISDICTION
Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention reads:
(1) An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the
plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his
principal place of business, or where he has a place of business
through which the contract has been made, or before the court
at the place of destination.
2 3
20 See MILLER, supra note 6, at 293-94. Miller cites a French case, Cie Air France
c. Liberator [(1974) 28 R.F.D.A. 287 (C.A. Paris, 8 December 1973)], in which the
issue was to identify the court 'at the place of destination'. The ticket indicated
'Paris-Orly' as the destination of the flight, and it was not contested that the pas-
senger had in fact disembarked at Orly airport. Most of the facilities of the air-
port being located in the district (department) of Essonne, the plaintiff brought
her action in Evry-Corbeil, the city where the courts of the Essonne district are
located. Air France challenged the competence of the court on the basis that the
real destination of the flight was Paris, the name of the airport servicing the city
being mentioned on the ticket only for the information of the passenger ....
The Cour de Cassation held that the provisions of the Convention do not prevent
the airport where the passenger disembarks from being the place of destination
of the contractual carriage and refused to interfere with the courts of appeals'
interpretation of the intent of the contracting parties according to which the
destination of the flight was effectively Orly airport. See id. at 294. The courts of
Paris and the courts of Evry-Corbeil are separated by only fifteen to twenty miles!
See id.
21 See Case Law Digest, Italy: International Carriage of Passenger, 21 AIR & SPACE
LAw 257 (1996) (summarizing Menichini v. Empresa Consolidada Cubana de
Aviaci6n, Tribunal of Milan, Judgment No. 4888, 19 May 1994.)
22 All of the Internet related case law in this paper is American.
23 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3 at 1146. Article 33 of the New Convention
reads:
An action for damages may be brought, at the option of the plain-
tiff, in the territory of one of the States Parties, either before the
court of the domicile of the carrier or of its principal place of busi-
ness, or where it has a place of business through which the contract
has been made or before the Court at the place of destination.
In respect of damage resulting from the death or injury of a passen-
ger, an action may be brought before one of the courts mentioned
in paragraph 1 of this Article, or in the territory of a State Party in
which at the time of the accident the passenger has his or her prin-
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As the third jurisdiction ("the place of business through
which the contract has been made," which is the subject matter
of the paper) will be discussed in a separate paragraph below,
and the following short comments about the three other pos-
sibilities can be made.
First, assuming that the carrier is a corporation in the U.K
and the U.S., the "domicile is determined by the place of incor-
poration. '2 4 In contrast, in France, "the domicile of a corpora-
tion is usually the place designated in its Articles of Association
.... 25 Notwithstanding the discrepancy, there is little risk of
serious difficulties between judicial application, because of the
fact that "for a given purpose, there can be only one domicile. 26
Second, the principal place of business refers to the carrier's
actual center of management. It has generally been held that a
carrier can only have one principal place of business.2 1
Finally, the place of destination is in principle determined by
the contract.2 8 The last stopping place as indicated in the con-
tract of carriage is decisive; true intentions of the passenger,
which differ from the contract are as irrelevant in this context as
accidental deviation from the originally planned course of the
journey.29
Generally, two observations about the Article can be made.
First, it seems that the Article is passenger oriented since the
choice of forum is vested in the plaintiff. Second, three of the
four fora center around the place of business of the carrier.
These two observations seem to be somewhat inconsistent: the
passenger/plaintiff has the choice, and yet none of the places to
choose among necessarily relates to the passenger. In the
United States, this has sometimes led to dismissal of a case
brought by a U.S. citizen in a U.S. court even though the foreign
carrier involved would have qualified as a defendant under the
cipal and permanent residence and to or from which the carrier
operates services for the carriage of passengers by air, either on its
own aircraft, or another carrier's aircraft pursuant to a commercial
agreement, and in which that carrier conducts its business of car-
riage by air from premises leased or owned by the carrier itself or
by another carrier with which it has a commercial agreement ....
New Convention, supra note 12.
24 MILLER, supra note 6, at 301.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See GIEMULLA ET AL., supra note 6, at 28-5.
28 See id. at 28-9.
29 See id.
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traditional U.S. long arm jurisdiction.3 0 For example, in the in-
stance where a U.S. citizen temporarily residing abroad
purchases a Paris to New York to Paris ticket on a foreign carrier
like Air France, that carrier would generally be subject to juris-
diction in the courts of the United States. However, Article 28
of the Convention would prevent the U.S. citizen from suing the
carrier in the United States in a Warsaw case even though such a
suit could be brought in the absence of the Convention.
These difficulties led to proposals to amend the Article. One
of these amendments to the Warsaw Convention was introduced
by the Guatemala City Protocol in 1971.31 Its Article XII, which
inserts a new Article 28(2) into the Warsaw Convention as
amended at The Hague, provides:
In respect of damage resulting from the death, injury or delay of
a passenger or the destruction, loss, damage or delay of baggage,
the action may be brought before one of the Courts mentioned
in paragraph 1 of this Article, or in the territory of one of the
High Contracting Parties, before the Court within the jurisdic-
tion of which the carrier has an establishment if the passenger
has his domicile or permanent residence in the territory of the
same High Contracting Party. 2
What is introduced in the new paragraph is a "fifth jurisdic-
tion" in addition to the four named in the original Warsaw Con-
vention. The "fifth jurisdiction" is attractive to the United States
in that it would enable passengers who are ordinarily or perma-
nently resident in the United States to bring actions coming
under the Warsaw system before U.S. courts. Apart from the
matter of convenience for them, they would also benefit from
the application of U.S. laws, including U.S. laws on damages (al-
beit limited unbreakably to the equivalent of USD 100,000 in
Poincar6 francs according to the Article XIV of the Guatemala
so See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987)
(plurality opinion), holding that despite the presence of minimum contacts tradi-
tionally required under the International Shoe test (International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)), the assumption of jurisdiction would be un-
constitutional in some circumstances. In all cases the courts must also test the
facts against equitable notions of "fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 113.
However, it is noteworthy that Article 28(1) has been held not to violate the con-
stitutional right to due process. See People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Air
France v. Giliberto, 15 Avi. 17.429 (1978).
Si See Guatemala City Protocol, supra note 11, at 615.
32 Id.
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City Protocol.). 33 The U.S. signed the Protocol, but has not rati-
fied it. 34
As already noted, there have been other suggestions to rem-
edy the situation where a passenger purchases a ticket outside
his or her domicile and hence is prevented from bringing an
action there.3 5 The proposal to solve these concerns include a
contractual "fifth jurisdiction" or submission of the cases to
binding arbitration by giving the claimant the right to make a
post-accident election to invoke such a procedure. 6
For the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to simply note
that numerous efforts have been made to add the passenger's
domicile as a jurisdictional option.
C. PLACE OF BUSINESS THROUGH WHICH THE CONTRACT
HAS BEEN MADE
According to the terms of the third jurisdiction of Article 28,
to obtain valid jurisdiction a plaintiff must show that: (1) carrier
has a place of business in that country; (2) through which; (3)
the contract has been made.37
Consequently, the following questions arise: 1) what is to be
considered a carrier's place of business; 2) does the contract
necessarily have to have been made at this place of business, and
3) how and when is the contract under consideration formed?
The examination of the two first questions follows this para-
graph, and the study of the last question concerning contracts of
carriage and their formation appears in Part V, in context with
the study of the contract formation on the Internet.
1. Carnier's Place of Business
Most of the discussion concerning the "place of business" ele-
ment has revolved around the question of whether business
done with an independent agent, which sells a large number of
tickets, 6 can lead to the application of Article 28(1). As evident
33 See Cheng, supra note 14, at 119.
34 The same is true for the New Convention, which is almost equivalent to the
Hague Protocol in its jurisdictional aspects. See New Convention, supra note 24.
35 This is true unless the passenger's domicile happens to be the airline's dom-
icile, its principal place of business, or the destination of the flight.
36 See Dean, supra note 14.
37 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, at 1146.
38 Travel agents currently sell 80% of airline tickets sold in the "physical
world." See Mark Halper, Microsoft Wants the U.S. to Investigate Possible Antitrust
Violations by the Nation's Airlines, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1999 at C1.
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from the discussion below, Article 28(1)'s only authentic version
(in French) would not allow this. However, the majority of
courts around the world have held that the Article covers tickets
sold by agents.39 This result can be reached either by defining
the term "place of business"/"establishment" more broadly, or
by attributing the act of the agency to the carrier. Either way
tends to lead to the same result, provided that the carrier has a
place of business in the country in which the case is pending.
Where this is not the case, jurisdiction can only be established
by a liberal interpretation of "place of business"/
"establishment."
The official text of Article 28 was drafted to read "ot il posside
un itablissement par le soin dequel le contrat it conclu' '40 or freely
translated, where the airline owns an establishment through
which the contract has been concluded. Notwithstanding this,
in the U.S. version of the Convention, the term "place of busi-
ness" was adopted. The discrepancy between the original text
and the English translation, 41 among other things, has contrib-
uted to the differing lines of decisions in France and the U.S.
The French adopted a strict interpretation of the concept it-
ablissement.4 2 The case Herftoy c. Cie Artop43 which is commonly
cited 41 in this context illustrates this: the court defined itablisse-
ment as being the center of operations of a corporation, geo-
graphically distinct from its headquarters, but excluding its
filials (subsidiaries or branches) and agencies. The plaintiff in
the case sued the carrier in Paris claiming that the permanent
agency agreement between the carrier and his sales agent was
sufficient to establish that he has an itablissement in that city.
The court rejected that argument on the basis that business
premises must be directly owned by the carrier in order to be
characterized as itablissement. The decision flows naturally from
the French text of the Convention since the carrier has to 'pos-
sede un itablissement.' The idea of ownership (implied in the verb
possider) is not present in the English translation, which simply
39 See GiEMULLA ET AL., supra note 6.
40 Warsaw Convention, art. 28.
41 Of which there are two versions: a British one and an American one, which
slightly differ from each other. It is noteworthy that the authentic English text of
Article 28 as amended at Guatemala City uses the word 'establishment.'
42 See MILLER, supra note 6, at 305.
43 16 R.F.D.A. 177 (C.A. Paris, 2 March 1962).
44 See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 6, at 304; LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WAR-
SAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A LEGAL HANDBOOK, 145 (1988); GIEMULLA ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 28-5.
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refers to the places where the carrier 'has' a place of business or
an establishment in the British version.
Even the strict French courts have had to yield to some ex-
tent. In a case where there were two defendants, the carrier and
the insurer of the lost baggage, the court held that the carrier
could be sued in the same jurisdiction as the insurer although
the court did not have jurisdiction as provided by Article
28(1)." 5 The decision to combine the suits was based on French
law of civil procedure.
In the United States, a "place of business" is more broadly
defined and includes offices maintained by the carrier as well as
mere agents who sell tickets. As noted above, a requirement of
ownership of the "place of business" does not apply. In Berner v.
United Airlines, Inc.,46 defendant British Commonwealth Pacific
Airlines, Ltd. ("BCPA"), an Australian corporation, made a writ-
ten agreement with British Overseas Airways Corporation
("BOAC") with respect to business to be conducted for BCPA.
BOAC was appointed "General Sales Agent" and was required to
"observe and comply with all reasonable directions and instruc-
tions" given by BCPA "concerning all matters affecting or arising
out of" the agreement. The business relationship was thus
much closer than is usually the case under an interline agree-
ment. BOAC, in pursuance of the agreement, sold at its New
York office a ticket for a round trip between New York and Syd-
ney via San Francisco. In an accident on a BCPA plane, the pas-
senger, Mr. William Kapell (at the time one of the world's most
famous pianists), was killed. His executors commenced an ac-
tion in the courts of New York, which found that it could hear
the case because New York was "[a] place of business . . .
'through which the contract has been made"' by BCPA.47 New
York was also the place that had the closest relation to the sale of
the ticket, a fact that was also emphasized by the court. A broad
definition was thus given to a "place of business":
This language includes places maintained by the carrier itself or
through agents at which the ticket is sold. The language de-
scribes a 'place of business,' not necessarily in the broad or gen-
eral connotation of the term, but one closely related to the sale of the
ticket, i.e., where the 'contract has been made.'
45 See GiEMULLA ET AL., supra note 6, (citing French case Dame Teste c. Assur-
ance Mutuelle G~n~rale Fran;aise Accidents et Swissair, 1985 R.F.D.A. 348, 1986
AL 101, Tribunal de Commerce de Cannes).
46 157 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1956).
47 Id. at 888.
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A definite location in the area of jurisdiction, some regularity in
the business of selling tickets, and the sale there of the ticket
which gives rise to '[a]n action for damages seem literally to
meet the requirements of the situs of the court contemplated by
the Convention.48
A federal court of appeals went further in relaxing the re-
quirements of what constitutes a "place of business." In Eck v.
United Arab Airlines, Inc.,49 the passenger, Miss Eck, was a mem-
ber of the California Far West Ski Association, and signed up for
the Ski Association's Charter Flight operated by SAS from Los
Angeles to Zurich. Miss Eck decided, that aside from skiing, she
would do some sight seeing on her own, and purchased a ticket
from the office of Scandinavian Airline Systems (SAS) in Oak-
land, CA. for the following side trip: Zurich-Vienna (Swissair);
Vienna-Istanbul (SAS); Istanbul-Athens (Swissair); Athens-Bei-
rut, Beirut-Jerusalem (Middle East Airlines); Jerusalem-Cairo
(United Arab Airlines); Cairo-Rome-Naples-Rome (Alitalia);
Rome-Zurich (Swissair). The accident occurred during a flight
performed by United Arab Airlines (UAA) between Jerusalem
and Cairo because of bad weather, and the aircraft crashed on
landing in Wadi Halfa, Sudan, seriously injuring Miss Eck.50
As stated, Miss Eck bought her ticket in a SAS office in Califor-
nia. This office was in no specific agency relationship to the
actual carrier, UAA. There was only a tacit arrangement
whereby each airline would issue tickets and collect fares for air
transport to be performed by the other.51 Miss Eck sued in fed-
eral and state courts in New York City, where UAA had an actual
office, though not one that had participated in any way in the
sale of the ticket. The courts of appeals on both the federal and
state level reversed the lower courts, and ruled that Article 28's
third ground of jurisdiction required only that the "place of
business" of the carrier, and the making of the contract were
present in the territory of a particular country concerned.5 2 The
crux is what is to be understood by the phrase a "place of busi-
ness." Two interesting features of the Eck decision address this
issue.
4 Id. at 887 (emphasis added).
49 360 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1966); and in state court, Eck v. United Arab Airlines,
Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 53 (1964).
- See Eck, 360 F.2d at 807.
51 See id. at 814.
52 See id.
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First, in Berner, the New York courts had already recognized
that in some cases a foreign airline could be regarded as having
a place of business, even though the airline had no office in the
country and, instead, transacted all its business in that country
through an agent there." The court in Eck saw SAS's California
office as UAA's place of business, but only because UAA already had
established its own regular ticketing and booking office in the U.S. The
following lengthy but critical excerpts from the Federal Court of
Appeals' decision demonstrate this:
[Article 28] clearly manifests the framers' intention to permit, at
least in some cases, the maintenance of the suit in the courts of
the country where the ticket was purchased. It is equally clear
that another purpose of this provision is to prevent the maintenance
of suit in the courts of the country where the ticket was purchased if the
airline has no ticketing and booking office there. The close question is
whether this provision prevents the maintenance of suit in the courts of
the country where the ticket was purchased, when the airline 'has a place
of business' in that country at which tickets are regularly sold, but the
passenger had purchased his ticket at the office of another airline or at a
travel agency.54
"The central purpose of Article 28(1) 's third provision was to
make venue always proper in the country where the ticket was
purchased . . . if, but only if the defendant has a place of business
there."55
"We hold that this agency arrangement between SAS and
UAA taken together with the existence of UAA booking offices in this
country justified the conclusion that the Oakland SAS office was
a UAA 'place of business'-'etablissement' in the official French
text-through which the contract had been made. 56
In short, we hold that venue is proper under Article 28(1)'s third
provision in the courts of a High Contracting Party when the de-
fendant has a place of business in that country at which it regu-
larly issues tickets even though the injured passenger's ticket is
purchased at the office of another airline and confirmed abroad
on the ground that the office that issued the ticket to the passen-
ger should be regarded as a "place of business" of the defendant
airline "through which the contract has been made."57
53 See Berner v. United Airlines, Inc., 157 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1956).
54 Eck, 360 F.2d at 813 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
55 Id. at 814 (emphasis added).
56 Id. (emphasis added).
57 Id.
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Furthermore, several respected secondary authorities suggest
that when the defendant airline has at least one regular ticketing and
booking office in a High Contracting Party venue should be proper
in that country on an agency rationale ... even though the pas-
senger purchased his ticket for travel on a flight of the defendant
at the office of another airline or a travel agency .... Our hold-
ing simply means that a foreign airline which has done this [es-
tablished a regular ticketing and booking office] cannot avoid
the reach of this provision if it instructs other airlines and travel
agencies that occasionally act as its sales agents in that country to
confirm the sales directly with the foreign airline's overseas
office.58
It therefore seems that if UAA had not had a place of business
in the U.S., it could not have been sued in the U.S. merely be-
cause the ticket was sold there (and because the agency relation-
ship was a 'weak' single instance tacit interline arrangement, as
opposed to the one in Berner)." It seems that Eck thus allows the
"place of business" to have two meanings: 1) a "place of busi-
ness" through which the ticket is purchased, and 2) a "place of
business" of the carrier which must be present in the same terri-
tory as the first "place of business."60
The second interesting feature of the decision is that the rea-
soning used by both the federal and state courts is worded in
terms strongly reminiscent of cases dealing with questions of
personal jurisdiction.6 1 Especially in the decision of the New
York Court of Appeals, it was emphasized that the carrier sub-
mitted itself to the jurisdiction of the courts by voluntarily estab-
lishing an office in New York.62 By doing so, the defendant
anticipated that it would be amenable to suit there.63 Thus, it
seems that the "place of business" interpretation in the U.S. is
subject to much the same doctrine as the one used to determine
58 Id. at 815 (emphasis added).
59 Also, Miller notes this and states: "[A] decisive factor in the case was that,
besides the transaction concluded in the Californian SAS office, UAA operated a
place of business of its own within the territory of the United States." MILLER,
supra note 6, at 305. Miller goes on further to say that "[t]he fact that the air
carrier operated a place of business in the United States, together with the issu-
ance of a ticket through an agent within the same territory was enough to satisfy
the Convention." Id. at 307.
- See Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1966).
61 See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (identifying cases dealing with
personal jurisdiction).
62 See Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 53, 58 (1964).
63 See Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 360 F.2d at 814.
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whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a company. 64 Ac-
cording to the doctrine set out in International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington,65 and later refined and elaborated in decisions such as
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,66 Keeton v. Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc.,6 7 and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,6 a the test of juris-
diction focuses on the presence of "minimum contacts" with the
forum, and jurisdiction must be in accord with "notions of fair
play and substantial justice." Thus, an action against a carrier in
the U.S. is likely if the carrier can, in fairness, be expected to
defend itself in the state where the suit is brought.
As a result, travel agencies should not suffice to establish juris-
diction under a strict interpretation of Article 28(1). However,
the case law in many countries stands for a broader proposition
and, as previously indicated, even the French have had to allow
some room for interpretation. The broad interpretation of the
Article, which includes at least IATA/IATAN-Agencies69 even if
64 See MILLER, supra note 6, at 306.
65 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
- 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
67 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
- 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
69 An IATA-Agency is an agency that has the right to issue tickets for interna-
tional air travel, and that is in compliance with the standards IATA has set forth.
These standards vary from country to country, but the basic elements that all
IATA-Agencies should fulfill are: 1) a sufficient economic condition, 2) safety
and supervision of assets (IATA supervises and monitors accounts; the agencies
have to have sufficient equipment to protect tickets and other assets), and 3) the
personnel has to be trained according to IATA standards. See Telephone Inter-
view with Pirkko Tiukkanen, Director of IATA Finland (June 18, 1999).
The International Airlines Travel Agent Network (IATAN) is a
wholly owned subsidiary company of IATA. It is through this rela-
tionship that IATAN endorsed travel agencies become part of the
global community of travel agencies. Endorsement by LATAN
brings with it the specific appointments of international airlines.
The appointment is the mechanism that creates the legal bond be-
tween the carriers and the travel agencies.
IATAN Endorsement of Airline Appointed Travel Agencies (visited June 23, 1999)
<http://www.iatan.org/mnuAApEn.htm>. IATAN endorses-besides airline ap-
pointed, ticket stock-holding travel agencies-all other categories of travel agen-
cies in the U.S. called Travel Service Intermediary Agencies. Essential to both
programs is a set of objective, but appropriate, business standards that travel
agencies, wishing IATAN's endorsement, must meet. Concerning Travel Service
Intermediary Agency, these standards include, but are not limited to the follow-
ing: a) evidence that the agency has been in business and maintained a business
bank account for one year; b) proof that the agency has at least $250,000 in
annual gross sales; c) evidence of a $1 million errors and omissions insurance
policy; d) letters of recommendation from two travel industry suppliers; e) evi-
dence of the legal form of the business; f) compliance with all federal, state or
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the actual carrier does not have a place of business in the coun-
try of the court seized of the case, seems to be in line with the
one prevailing among most legal authors.7 0 In cases where the
relationship between the carrier and the "place of business" sell-
ing the ticket is weak (only a single instance tacit arrangement as
was the case in Eck), the presence of an actual carrier office in
the territory of the particular country concerned seems to be
required.
2. Relationship Between the Place of Business and the Contract
Again, two contradictory lines of decisions in the two coun-
tries, France and the United States, have emerged. In France, a
strict interpretation of the relationship between the carrier's
place of business and the contract of carriage seems to be fol-
lowed. This is illustrated in the case Orchestre Symphonique de
Vienne c. TWA, 7 1 where the court declared itself incompetent be-
cause it was not shown that the "itablissement" had played a role
in the making of the contract. In the TWA case, the ticket was
purchased from TWA's agent in Paris. Even though TWA had
its own "tablissement" in Paris, the court did not see the relation-
ship as sufficient to allow Article 28 jurisdiction. Even when the
ticket is issued by the carrier's actual agent, and even when the
carrier itself has an "itablissement" in the jurisdiction, France will
apparently not view the transaction as within Article 28 unless
the ticket was in fact purchased from the carrier's
"itablissement. 72
In the U.S., the relationship between the contract and the
place of business was detached in Eck73 to the extent that it "was
perceived in France as being one of the most shocking interpre-
tations of the Convention to come from the United States." 74
local registration and/or licensing requirements; g) proof that there are no
pending or unresolved complaints at state or local consumer affairs offices; h) a
showing that the agency is a member in good standing of a national travel organi-
zation or association; i) evidence of advertising the entity under the business
name, i.e. a listing in the telephone directory. See IATANEndorsed Agencies Are Part
of the Worldwide Connection (visited June 15, 1999) <http://www.iatan.org/
mnuGenEn.htm>.
70 See GIEMULLA, supra note 6 (stating that the German and the Swiss courts
also follow the opinion that an IATA-Agency may be considered a carrier's place
of business).
71 T.G.I Paris, 1971 35 R.G.A.E. 202.
72 See A6rofret c. St. Capitol Int'l, 1985 RFDA 213 (Trib. Comm. Paris, 1983).
73 360 F.2d 804 (1966).
74 MILLER, supra note 6, at 307.
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Contrary to what would have resulted from strictly applying the
letter of the Convention, there was no necessary link between
the two elements. The federal court of appeals wrote in its opin-
ion that:
"The problem of interpretation posed by this case should not
have been resolved by a mechanical application of the third pro-
vision's language and the easy assertion that a contrary result
would conflict with unarticulated notions about the original in-
tent of the Convention's framers." 5
Furthermore, the court stated that the language of the provi-
sion is highly relevant, but that it should not become a "verbal
prison. ' 76 The court reasoned that the text had been drafted in
1929 to suit the procedures for selling tickets at that time. 77 "Ar-
ticle 28 was read as essentially setting the criteria allowing a
court to ascertain whether it could hear a particular case, de-
pending on the absence or presence of the defendant air carrier
in a given territory. 78
It seems that Eck left the U.S. courts with the possibility of
interpreting the Convention in a liberal way, taking into account
that "the framers [of the Convention] were not so remarkably
prescient that they foresaw future interline arrangements [or
technical developments] . . . ,,79 The main reason that the
courts forcefully rejected the literal interpretation of the Con-
vention was that the text had been drafted to suit the proce-
dures for booking passages and selling tickets which existed in
1929. Considerable changes had occurred since, and a liberal
interpretation was appropriate "so that the treaty should accord
with the present factual situation."80 This leeway, however,
could prove to be the most crucial factor when the Convention
is applied in the context of new technical applications such as
electronic ticketing or tickets purchased through the Internet.
Although Eck was initially condemned by other nations, they
now face the same dilemma: either the Convention must be up-
dated to stand the challenges of recent technical and other de-
75 Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 360 F.2d 804, 812 (2d Cir. 1966).
76 Id.
77 The court also noted that principles of interpretation have a special rele-
vance when a treaty must be interpreted, "for the language of such a document is
less likely to be modified in the light of changing conditions than is the language
passed by a legislative body that convenes regularly." Id. at 812 n.18.
78 MILLER, supra note 6, at 308.
79 Eck, 360 F.2d at 813.
80 MILLER, supra note 6, at 308.
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velopments, or the courts in various member countries must be
allowed to reform the Convention by judicial decisions. In the
former alternative, an agreement must be found to overcome
the political and economic conflicts between the nations."' And
if the latter option is chosen, it is likely that the text of the Con-
vention will give rise to different lines of court decisions in the
major commercial aviation countries, which is the situation
today.82
III. INTERNET
In order to appreciate the legal questions at hand, it is neces-
sary to have a clear understanding of the Internet, which is not a
physical or tangible entity, but rather a giant network. It inter-
connects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer net-
works. It is thus a network of networks. This is best understood
if one considers what a linked group of computers, referred to
here as a "network," is and what it does. Small networks are
ubiquitous. "For example, in many U.S. courthouses, com-
puters are linked to each other for the purpose of exchanging
files and messages," and even sharing equipment such as
printers.8 3
Some networks are "closed" networks, not linked to other com-
puters or networks. Many networks, however, are connected to
other networks, which are in turn connected to other networks
in a manner that permits each computer in any network to com-
municate with computers on any other network in the system.
This global web of linked networks and computers is referred to
as the Internet.84
Individuals have a wide variety of avenues to access cyberspace in
general, and the Internet in particular. In terms of physical ac-
cess, there are two common methods to establish an actual link
to the Internet. First, one can use a computer or computer ter-
minal that is directly (and usually permanently) connected to a
computer network that is itself directly or indirectly connected to
the Internet. Second, one can use a "personal computer" with a
"modem" to connect over a telephone [or cable line] to a larger
81 An apt description of the difficulties of revising the Convention can be
found in ANDREAS LOWENFELD, AvIATION LAw, 7-98 (2d ed. 1981).
82 The New Convention proves that the political and economic conflicts can be
overcome. The full effect of the New Convention awaits the 30th instrument of
ratification, and most importantly the ratification of the U.S.
83 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
84 Id. at 831.
2000]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
computer or computer network that is itself directly or indirectly
connected to the Internet. . . . [B]oth direct and modem con-
nections are made available to people by a wide variety of aca-
demic, governmental, or commercial entities.8 5
Most individuals access the Internet by using commercial or
non-commercial Internet service providers ("ISP") that typically
offer modem telephone access to a computer or computer net-
work linked to the Internet. Many such providers are commer-
cial entities offering Internet access for a monthly or hourly fee.
Some ISPs, however, are non-profit organizations that offer free
or very low cost access to the Internet upon request.8 6
No single entity-academic, corporate, governmental, or non-
profit [organization]-administers the Internet. It exists and
functions as a result of the fact that hundreds of thousands of
separate operators of computers and computer networks inde-
pendently decided to use common data transfer protocols to ex-
change communications and information with other computers
.... There is no centralized storage location, control point, or
communications channel for the Internet, and it would not be
technically feasible ... to control all the information conveyed
on the Internet.
8 7
IV. JURISDICTION IN THE INTERNET
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Since the traditional personal jurisdiction doctrine has been
brought into play in the Warsaw Convention regime,8 it is nec-
essary to examine how the traditional notion of personal juris-
diction and the operations of an individual or a company on the
Internet can be reconciled. In a situation where the Convention
remains in its present form, it is likely that at least the U.S.
courts will turn to cyberspace law to draw on the jurisdictional
doctrines that have been developed there. 9 Even if this would
85 Id. at 832.
86 A good description of Internet Service Providers, types of aviation informa-
tion available on the Internet, and listings of some aviation related Uniform Re-
source Locations (URLs), can be found in George M. Moore, Aviation Information
on the Internet and World Wide Web for the Aviation and Space Law Attorney, 22:1 AN-
NALS OF AIR AND SPACE LAW 633 (1997).
87 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 832.
88 See Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 360 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1966).
89 Treaties control the exercise of jurisdiction in international transactions.
Where treaties do not exist, comity among nations has established a practice "by
which the final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are recip-
rocally carried into effect under certain regulations and restrictions which vary in
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not be the case, the application of the cyberspace jurisdiction
doctrine will at least function as supporting argumentation in a
situation where the rules of the Convention are deficient and
fail to give an answer.
It must be emphasized that the field of cyberspace law is a new
and developing area.90 Nonetheless, some trends and doctrines
have emerged. "Under U.S. law, the exercise of personal juris-
diction by a court over someone who is not physically present in
the state where the court is located must generally meet two
standards: there must be local law granting the court jurisdic-
tion, and that law must meet the due process standards of the
Constitution."91 Most states have a "long-arm" statute, that
under certain circumstances, grants the court jurisdiction over
persons who are not present in the state at the time a lawsuit
commences. The Warsaw Convention has no applicable "long-
arm" statute (or it can be said to be the Convention itself);
therefore, the examination must be made under the due pro-
cess clause, which brings us back to the concepts of 'minimum
contacts' and 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'
"The Constitutional limitations on the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction differ depending upon whether a court seeks to exer-
cise general or specific jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant. '9 2 A court exercises general jurisdiction over a de-
fendant when the court can hear litigation based on any of the
defendant's actions, whether or not taken within the geographi-
cal boundaries of the forum state. "In the absence of general
jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction permits a court to exercise per-
different countries." Wanda Ellen Wakefield, Annotation,Judgment of Court of For-
eign Country as Entitled to Enforcement or Extraterritorial Effect in State Court, 13
A.L.R.4th 1109, 1111-12 (1982). In general, the rules of personal jurisdiction are
applied by U.S. courts in much the same way in international transactions as they
are in interstate transactions. Thus, foreign defendants can be sued in the
United States on claims arising out of the "transaction of business" or the com-
mission of "tortious acts" in this country,
9 Applying principles of personal jurisdiction to conduct in cyberspace is an
even more recent phenomena. "With this global revolution looming on the hori-
zon, the development of the law concerning the permissible scope of personal
jurisdiction based on Internet use is in its infant stages. The cases are scant."
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24 (W.D. Pa.
1997).
91 BENJAMIN WRIGHT & JANE K. WINN, LAw OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE § 16.05
[A] (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 1999).
92 Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1122 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (citing Mellon Bank
(East) PSFS, N.A. v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1221 (3d Cir. 1992)).
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sonal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant for forum-re-
lated activities where the 'relationship between the defendant
and the forum falls within the 'minimum contacts' framework'
of International Shoe Co. v. Washington . . .and its progeny."93
Hence, for the purposes of the Warsaw Convention, specific ju-
risdiction should be scrutinized.
The court in Panavision Int'l, L.P., v. Toeppen94 applied general
standards applicable to personal jurisdiction claims, focusing on
whether there was purposeful availment of the forum jurisdic-
tion and whether the allegedly wrongful acts had significant ef-
fects within the jurisdiction. In applying these standards, the
court adopted a three prong test. First, the defendant must
have purposefully availed itself of doing business in the forum
state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of the state's
laws. Second, the cause of action must arise from the defend-
ant's activities with respect to the forum state. Finally, there
must be a substantial connection or nexus between the defend-
ant's acts and the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdic-
tion reasonable.95
The court acknowledged that applying the idea of purposeful
availment to the Internet was a relatively new issue. It refer-
enced back, however, to its earlier decision in Cybersell, Inc. v.
Cybersell, Inc.,9 6 where jurisdiction was not found over an out-of-
state passive web operator. There, the court held that an In-
ternet advertisement alone is not sufficient to subject a party to
jurisdiction in another state. In contrast, the Panavision court
held that the idea of purposeful availment was satisfied under
the so-called effects test. The effects test is used frequently in
reference to tort cases, and it clearly encompasses situations
where an extraterritorial act is intentional and expressly aimed
at the forum state.97
The Panavision court introduced and applied the three prong
test at the outset without reference to the nature of case (tort/
contract). This distinction was not invoked until the court had
already started to scrutinize the first prong (purposeful avail-
93 Id. (citation omitted).
94 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998).
95 The same test was used in following Internet related cases: Zippo Mfg. Co. v.
Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa 1997); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cyber-
sell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
96 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
97 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 15-19 (Supp.
1999).
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ment). As the Warsaw Convention can be examined under both
contract and tort regimes, it seems safe to conclude that a fur-
ther refinement is not needed for our purposes.
B. APPLICATION TO THE INTERNET
1. Purposeful Availment
The purposeful availment aspect of personal jurisdiction in
the Internet context was recently addressed in Cybersell, Inc. v.
Cybersell, Inc.98 In Cybersell, an Arizona corporation, Cybersell,
Inc. (Cybersell AZ), held a registered trademark for the name
Cybersell. A Florida corporation, Cybersell, Inc. (Cybersell FL),
created a web site with the domain name <cybsell.com>. The
web page had the word "Cybersell" at the top and the phrase
"Welcome to Cybersell!"99 Cybersell AZ claimed that Cybersell
FL infringed upon its registered trademark and brought an ac-
tion in district court in Arizona. The court held that Arizona
could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Cybersell FL, be-
cause it had no contacts with Arizona other than maintaining a
web page accessible to anyone over the Internet. 10 0 In reaching
this conclusion, the court reviewed cases from other circuits re-
garding personal jurisdiction in cyberspace. The court con-
cluded that no court had ever held that an Internet
advertisement alone is sufficient to subject a party to jurisdiction
in another state. 10 1 In each case where personal jurisdiction was
exercised, "there has been 'something more' to indicate that the
defendant purposefully (albeit electronically) directed his activ-
ity in a substantial way to the forum state."10 2
Personal jurisdiction was properly exercised, however, in the
landmark case CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,10 3 where the Sixth
Circuit recognized an electronic contract as a basis for finding
personal jurisdiction over a defendant. The defendant in the
case, a CompuServe subscriber, electronically transmitted his
computer software to CompuServe to buy and sell to other Com-
puServe subscribers. 4 In finding jurisdiction, the court implic-
98 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
99 Id. at 415.
oo See id. at 419-420.
101 See id. at 418.
102 Id.
103 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
104 The defendant placed his Internet navigation shareware on CompuServe's
system in order to market and sell his product. From his computer in Texas, the
defendant entered into a Shareware Registration Agreement (SRA) with Corn-
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ifly recognized the acceptance of an electronic contract, and it
focused on the fact that the defendant had: (1) entered into a
written contract with CompuServe that expressly provided that it
was entered into and governed by Ohio law; (2) exclusively used
CompuServe to advertise, market, and distribute his product;
(3) derived benefits from the marketing relationship with Com-
puServe, which income flowed through CompuServe in Ohio to
the defendant; and (4) initiated the events that led to the filing
of the lawsuit by sending an e-mail to CompuServe in Ohio.
The court found that the Texas Internet user's electronic con-
tact with Ohio-based CompuServe constituted a sufficient basis
for an Ohio federal court to exercise personal jurisdiction over
the defendant user. The court clearly gave weight to the fact
that the agreements between the parties specifically stated that
they were subject to Ohio law.105
Thus, it can be said that the courts have visualized personal
jurisdiction with regard to Internet-related issues on a sliding
scale. With few exceptions, at one end is a party who operates
an information-only web page not subject to personal jurisdic-
tion.106 At the other end is an e-commerce merchant who sub-
jects itself to personal jurisdiction by contracting and soliciting
business over the Internet.
10 7
2. Defendant's Activities Related to the Forum State
The second requirement for specific, personal jurisdiction is
that the claim asserted in the litigation arises out of the defend-
ant's forum-related activities.'0" It must simply be determined
puServe and assented to CompuServe's standard Service Agreement and Rules of
Operation. The SRA and the Service Agreement expressly provided that they
were entered into in Ohio, and the Service Agreement provided that it was gov-
erned by Ohio law. The SRA required Patterson's affirmative assent, i.e. he was
required to type "agree" at various points, in recognition of his online agreement
to the terms of the contract.
105 Those drafting and entering into online agreements should pay close atten-
tion to such choice of law and choice of forum clauses.
106 See, e.g., Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 297 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258, 1268 (N.D. Ill.
1997); McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15139 at *7
(S.D. Cal. 1996). But see Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161,
164 (D. Conn. 1996).
107 See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); Zippo
Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
108 See Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 474 (9th Cir. 1995).
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whether the plaintiff would not have been injured "but for" the
defendant's conduct.10 9
However, the application of the "arises out of' or the "but for"
test seems to present problems when a contract-related situation
is at hand. How can it be said that an airline's actions are di-
rected/related to a certain state when the airline is doing its
business on the Internet and practically everyone everywhere is
free to book a flight? So far, there are no Internet-related cases
that address this issue. We therefore turn to the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines."' Although the case
was later reversed in the Supreme Court on other grounds, the
Ninth Circuit's judgment relies on other circuits' decisions on
the "arises out of' issue, and it thus provides some guidelines on
how the courts might possibly solve the problem."1'
In Shute, the defendant maintained that the plaintiffs claim,
which was based on allegations of negligence with respect to
conditions on a cruise ship, did not "arise out of' the defend-
ant's business-solicitation contacts with the jurisdiction in ques-
tion (Washington). The defendant pointed to several cases
outside the circuit supporting its contention that, for purposes
of personal jurisdiction, "slip and fall" claims do not arise out of
the defendant's business-solicitation activities in the forum. '1 2
The court in Shute, however, invoked Cubbage v. Merchent11
which according to the court suggests that the Ninth Circuit has
not adopted a stringent standard of causation in evaluating
whether a court has specific jurisdiction." 4 The court read Cub-
109 See Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995).
110 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990).
111 Some courts have questioned the appellate courts decision. See e.g. Omeluk
v. Langsten Ship & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 271-72 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating
that "[t]he Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether the 'but for' test
was appropriate in Carnival Cruise Lines. But neither did the Court expressly note
that the jurisdiction issue was not before it ... or limit its grant of certiorari to a
separable issue. Because of the posture of the Court's reversal of Shute, it is not
clear whether the 'but for' test survives.") (citation omitted).
112 See Marino v. Hyatt Corp., 793 F.2d 427, 430 (1st Cir. 1986); Pearrow v.
National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1067, 1069 (8th Cir. 1983); see also
Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 339 F.2d 317, 321-22 (2d Cir. 1964).
113 744 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1984).
114 In Cubbage, the court was faced with a medical malpractice suit brought in-a
federal district court in California by a California resident against two doctors
and a hospital located in and licensed in Arizona. Although the doctors were not
licensed to practice in California, they applied for and were issued California
Medi-Cal numbers. Both doctors and the hospital were listed in a telephone di-
rectory which was distributed in the area of California lying adjacent to Arizona,
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bage as a rejection of the rigid causation standard advanced by
the defendant,115 and it stated that there is no logical reason
why a tort cannot grow out of a contractual contact. The court
went on to cite a case from the Fifth Circuit, Prejean v. Sonatrach,
Inc.1
16
[T]he contractual contact is a "but for" causative factor for the
tort since it brought the parties within tortious "striking distance" of one
another. While the relationship between a tort suit and a contrac-
tual contact is certainly more tenuous than when a tort suit arises
from a tort contact, that only goes to whether the contact is by
itself sufficient for due process, not whether the suit arises from
the contact."' 17
Furthermore, the court noted that the "'but for' test is consis-
tent with the basic function of the 'arising out of' require-
ment-it preserves the essential distinction between general and
specific jurisdiction." ' The "but for" test preserves the require-
ment that there be some nexus between the cause of action and
the defendant's activities in the forum.
A restrictive reading of the "arising out of' requirement is not
necessary in order to protect potential defendants from unrea-
sonable assertions of jurisdiction. The third prong of the [test]
provides that protection. If the connection between the defend-
ant's forum related activities is "too attenuated," the exercise of
jurisdiction would be unreasonable, and therefore in violation of
due process. 1 9
Applying the Cubbage standard, the Shute court concluded that
the plaintiff's cause of action arose out of defendant's contacts
with the forum, because the defendant's solicitation of business
and a significant number of the defendants' patients (including Cubbage) were
California residents. Applying the test, the court held that the exercise of specific
jurisdiction did not offend due process. Of particular relevance is the court's
holding that the appellant's malpractice claim arose out of the defendant's solici-
tation of patients from California. See id. at 670. Had the Cubbage court applied
reasoning similar to that utilized in the cases cited by Carnival Cruise Lines, Cub-
bage's claim would have arisen out of the doctor's negligent treatment of Cub-
bage in Arizona, not out of the business solicitation activities in California.
115 Decisions by at least two other courts of appeal support the view that a tort
can arise from prior business solicitation in the forum state. See Lanier v. Ameri-
can Bd. of Endodontics, 1988 U.S. App. Lexis 8735 (6th Cir. 1988); Prejean v.
Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1267 (5th Cir. 1981). These courts apply a "but
for" test of causality in this type of situation.
116 652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1981).
17 Id. at 1270 n.21 (emphasis added).
1s Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990).
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attracted the plaintiffs (through their travel agent) to the de-
fendant. 121 In the absence of defendant's activity, the plaintiffs
would not have taken the cruise, and plaintiff's injury would not
have occurred. "It was [defendant's] forum-related activities




"Even if the two first prongs are satisfied, an unreasonable ex-
ercise ofjurisdiction violates the Due Process Clause."1 2 2 In eval-
uating reasonableness, seven factors need to be evaluated: (1)
the extent of the defendant's purposeful interjection; (2) the
defendant's burdens from litigating in the forum; (3) the extent
of conflict with the sovereignty of defendant's state; (4) the fo-
rum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most ef-
ficientjudicial resolution to the controversy; (6) the importance
of the forum to the plaintiffs interest in convenient and effec-
tive relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum.1 23 All
seven factors must be weighed.1 24 No one factor is dispositive. 125
These factors will not be scrutinized here since their applica-
tion in practice will depend on the circumstances in each
case.
12 6
V. FORMATION OF CONTRACTS OF CARRIAGE AND
CONTRACTS IN THE INTERNET
A. CONTRACTS OF CARRIAGE
In order to determine the carrier's relevant place of business,
the concept of contract, to which the jurisdictional provision of
the Convention refers, needs to be clarified. In some cases it is
relatively easy to say that a contract has emerged (e.g., when the
passenger buys the ticket at the point of departure from the car-
rier which then provides the service described in the ticket). In
other more complex situations, however, it is unclear when the
meeting of the minds occurs and how it can occur.
120 See id. at 386.
121 Id.
122 Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1995).
123 Id.; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1995).
124 See Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus., 11 F.3d 1482, 1488 (9th Cir. 1993).
125 See id.
126 For application in practice, see, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141
F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
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The only provision that concerns the concept of the contract
is the first sentence of Article 3(2) of the Convention which
states: "absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall
not affect the existence or the validity of the contract of trans-
portation, which shall none the less be subject to the rules of
this convention." 12v Thus, it is clear that the ticket is distin-
guished from the contract of transportation. Because the Con-
vention does not give better guidelines as to what the contract
actually is, the courts have made their own formulation.
In Boyar v. Korean Air Lines,128 the passenger, Mr. Lee, bought
a ticket in Seoul, South Korea, from Northwest Orient Airlines
("NOA"). His trip was to begin and end in Seoul with one inter-
mediate stop in Tokyo and six in the United States. The first
two legs of the flight, Seoul-to-Tokyo, and Tokyo-to-Los Angeles,
were booked on NOA. The other segments of the ticket were
left open as to date, carrier, and flight. "Mr. Lee paid the fare
for the entire journey ... at the time the ticket was issued."129
On August 30, 1983, the New York office of Korean Air Lines
("KAL") reserved a space for Mr. Lee on KAL's Flight 007.
"KAL did not issue a new ticket.., because New York-to-Seoul
was already listed as the final leg on Mr. Lee's original ticket.
For the same reason, no new fare was paid."130
KAL argued that in no circumstance can there be a contract
between an airline and a passenger before the passenger ticket
is issued, and that the passenger ticket is the contract under Ar-
ticle 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. Furthermore, KAL's po-
sition was that the location where the ticket was issued controls
the jurisdictional question of Article 28(1) regardless of whether
the passenger takes a different flight from the one set forth in
the ticket, purchases a ticket which is open as to flight or carrier,
or pays for the ticket and gives all the necessary information for
its issuance in another jurisdiction.3 Mr. Lee argued that the
127 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3.
128 664 F. Supp. 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The case consisted of three actions,
which were based on different factual situations. All of them, however, require
an answer to the question "when is a contract for air carriage formed?" Here,
only the first of these actions is presented (the "Lee action") in order to avoid
describing all of the different factual situations. The question of when a contract
for air carriage is formed is at the core of each case. The accident that was the
basis for all three actions happened when the Soviets shot down the aircraft KAL
007.
129 Id. at 1483.
130 Id.
131 See id. at 1484-1485.
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ticket is merely evidence of the contract into which the airline
and the passenger entered and that the contract itself cannot be
formed until the passenger selects, and the airline books, the
particular flight on which the passenger will actually travel. 1 2
The court held that "[a]lthough the ticket did not refer to
[KAL] or to Flight 007, it was this ticket that enabled [the pas-
senger] to take that flight. ' 133 Mr. Lee consented to be trans-
ported round-trip from Seoul to New York with seven
intermediate stops when he bought his ticket from NOA. KAL's
promise occurred when its agent, NOA, obligated it to perform
the carriage by issuing the ticket. The mutual consent necessary
to the formation of the contract occurred in Seoul, and the
United States was, therefore, not an appropriate jurisdiction to
hear the action. Thus, the contractual relationship requires
only that the carrier consent to undertake the international
transportation of the passenger from the designated spot to an-
other, and that the passenger in turn consent to the undertak-
ing (meeting of the minds); the passenger ticket was "not the
contract but its issuance evidenced the contractual relationship
between (the parties)." '134
An example of a case where tickets were purchased with a
credit card (as would be the case in most Internet purchases) is
Shen v. Japan Airlines.'35 In Shen, the plaintiffs sued JAL and the
Japan Immigration Bureau for damages allegedly sustained
when they were refused entry into Japan. The plaintiffs argued
that the place of business where the contract was made was New
York, because the plaintiffs purchased the JAL tickets in Shang-
hai, China, through American Express.'36 The crux of plaintiffs
argument was that because the tickets were purchased with an
American Express card, the contract was not made until the
charge was posted to their account in New York. The court
held, however, that the "use of an American Express card in
132 See id. at 1485.
133 Id. at 1486.
14 Id. at 1485 (citing Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323,
336 (5th Cir. 1967)).
135 918 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
136 See id. at 690. The plaintiff's complaint stated that "defendants false[ly]-
arrested and malicious[ly] prosecuted plaintiffs by keeping them in ajail for over
fifteen hours without any food and illegally searched them and seized their pass-
ports and luggage and then forced them back to Shanghai, China. As a result,
plaintiffs were delayed returning to the United States and suffered great pain of
body and mind, and incurred more expenses for traveling and medical attention,
and loss of time from work. Id. at 688.
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Shanghai does not render New York the place of purchase sim-
ply because the charge was eventually posted there." 37 More-
over, the plaintiffs did not dispute that the original tickets were
issued in Shanghai. The holding in Shen is in line with that in
Boyar v. Korean Air Lines.
B. CONTRACTS IN THE INTERNET
"Over the years, courts have generally required that contracts
formed with the aid of new technologies comport with existing
legal principles."1 38 Thus, understanding traditional legal issues
and concepts such as offer and acceptance is crucial to parties
seeking to effectively use the Internet in the contracting
process.139
"A contract, whether or not it is formed wholly or partially
online, is a promise or set of promises that is enforceable at law.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts explains that the formation
of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation
of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration."'' 40 Mu-
tual assent is usually reached through offer and acceptance.
"Whether an offer or an acceptance is made by electronic means
[through the Internet] should not in itself prevent formation of
valid and enforceable contracts."'4 1
An offer is essentially a manifestation of a party's ("the of-
feror's") intent to enter into a bargain with another party ("the
offeree") which grants the offeree the power to create a contract by its
acceptance.'4 2 An offer creates a power of acceptance in the of-
feree and a corresponding duty on the part of the offeror.
For our purposes, it is important to note that according to the
so-called "mailbox rule," the acceptance becomes effective-and
the contract concluded-upon mailing the acceptance. "The
137 Id. at 690.
138 JULIAN S. MILLSTEIN ET AL., DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET § 8.01 (1997).
139 However, as the following contract law issues either do not apply or are not
readily applicable, they will not be considered here: (1) Statute of Frauds (appli-
cable only to five specific cases of contracts, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 110 (1981); no court has yet addressed the enforceability of purely
electronic contracts under the Statute of Frauds), and (2) the Magnuson-Moss
Act (the purpose of the Act is to "improve the adequacy of information available
to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of
consumer products .... See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302(a) et seq., enacted Jan. 4, 1975.)
140 MILLSTEIN, supra note 138, § 8.04[3] (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 1 (1981)).
141 See id.
142 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981).
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Internet raises unresolved questions about how the mailbox rule
should be applied to electronic communications." 143 In an ideal
situation, communications on the Internet can be transmitted
quickly worldwide regardless of distance. Although transmis-
sions may sometimes be slowed or delayed by computer or tele-
communications failures, or by heavy Internet traffic or usage,
in most cases "the mailbox rule should not apply to Internet
communications in the same way that it would not apply to
other forms of substantially instantaneous communication.' 14
For the purposes of this study, an ideal situation is assumed in
order to simplify the already complicated scheme.
"In determining whether an electronic communication will be
deemed to be an offer, it is important that the terms involved be
clearly defined. The essential terms must be sufficiently definite
so that the nature and extent of the parties' obligations can be
determined.' ' 45 Correspondingly, electronic communications
that reasonably manifest acceptance by an offeree should mani-
fest assent to the same bargain proposed by an offer and comply
with the offer's terms to be effective. 146 Electronic communica-
tions that reasonably manifest acceptance by an offeree should,
therefore, be valid and give rise to an enforceable contract.
It is often hard to distinguish electronic communications that
constitute offers from other communications. Expressions of
opinion, or communications of hope, intention or desire, are
not deemed to be offers. The wider the audience, the more
likely it is that a communication will be viewed as a solicitation
of an offer rather than an offer. Thus, advertisements of goods
or services are ordinarily not treated as offers to sell, but rather
as invitations to make offers to buy.
In the case of airline companies' or travel agents' Internet
pages, "sufficiently definite" manifestations of intent 47 to sell a
ticket are frequently posted on them. 148 Offers contain dates,
departure and arrival times, prices, aircraft types, and even in-
formation about meals offered onboard. A person wanting to
buy a ticket can accept the offer by submitting "a communica-
tion that reasonably manifests acceptance," i.e. by typing in his/
143 MILSTEIN, supra note 138, at § 8.04[4].
144 Id.
145 Id. at § 8.04[3].
14 This is commonly known as the "mirror image rule."
147 MILISTEIN, supra note 138, at § 8.04[3].
148 In addition to advertising, this is clearly the main function of most of the
pages.
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her name, address, telephone number, and other personal in-
formation in addition to the flight information and a credit card
number. The contract is then concluded with the clicking of a
"submit" (or a corresponding) icon on the Internet page. The
issuance of the ticket, or the marking that will be made to the
airline's computer system when electronic ticketing is used, is
not the contract, but merely an evidence of the contractual rela-
tionship between the parties.149
C. ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION
In May 1997, the European Union enacted a directive on the
protection of consumers in connection with distance contracts,
which will regulate international sales over the Internet. 5 ° The
directive which is likely to have a significant impact on elec-
tronic commerce,' applies to all types of distance contracts,
which it defines as:
any contract concerning goods or services concluded between a
supplier and a consumer under an organized distance sales or
service-provision scheme run by the supplier, who, for the pur-
pose of the contract, makes exclusive use of one or more means
of distance communication up to and including the moment at
which the contract is concluded152
As airline companies fall within the category of transportation
contracts, for which the application of Articles 4-6 and 7(1) of
the Directive has been exempted, 153 they are not likely to be
affected by most of the material rules that will be set out in the
upcoming national legislation. 15 4 The remaining rules that will
apply to airline companies regulate issues of minor importance
such as fraudulent use of credit cards, unsolicited supply of
goods or services, and measures for judicial or material redress.
149 See Boyar v. Korean Air Lines, 664 F. Supp. 1481, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 336 (5th Cir. 1967).
150 Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997
on the Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance Contracts [hereinafter "Direc-
tive"] (visited March 10, 1999) <http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/
en397L0007.html>. According to Article 15(1) of the Directive, European Union
member states have three years to implement its provisions (i.e., byJune 4, 2000).
151 MILLSTEIN, supra note 138 § 8.04[7].
152 Directive, supra note 150, at Art. 2(1).
153 See Directive, supra note 150, at Art. 3(2).
154 See Directive, supra note 150, at Art. 14 (allowing Member States to intro-
duce or maintain more stringent provisions to ensure a higher level of consumer
protection).
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VI. WARSAW CONVENTION ARTICLE 28(1) AND
THE INTERNET
By offering a website that is genuinely useful and informa-
tive-as opposed to merely promotional-airlines can create a
valuable link to their best customers. The actual sale of tickets
on the Internet by the airline company to a customer can hap-
pen in two ways: the ticket is bought either directly from the
airline's homepage, or from a travel agent's homepage. These
alternatives are considered separately below.
Most major airlines offer easy-to-use booking procedures on
their sites and entice travelers with Internet-only fare dis-
counts. 15 5 While travel agents currently sell 80 percent of all air-
line tickets sold in the physical world, they sell only 50 percent
of all tickets sold online. 156 It has been predicted that online
agents' portion of the web market will plummet to 25 percent by
2003 as the airlines step up efforts to sell directly through their
own websites1 57
The case where the ticket is bought directly from the airline's
site will be discussed first, followed by a discussion of the case
where the purchase has been made through a travel agent's site.
A. TICKETS ARE PURCHASED THROUGH AIRLINE'S
INTERNET SITE
From the analysis made in chapter V, it seems safe to say that
the contract referred to in Article 28(1) is concluded on the
Internet when the passenger enters the necessary data on the
airline's Internet site and then sends this information to the air-
15 For example, in February 1999 US Airways offered a Philadelphia-Seattle
round trip for $249. Its 21-day advanced notice rate was $398, and its full fare was
$1,816. Delta Air Lines threw down a gauntlet earlier in 1999 when it imple-
mented a $2 surcharge on all flights booked through any means other than its
own website. A consumer uproar prompted Delta later to rescind the fee.
156 See Mark Halper, Microsoft Wants the U.S. to Investigate Possible Antitrust Viola-
tions by the Nation's Airlines, N.Y. TIMES Mar. 10, 1999, at C1.
157 See id. This development has caused the travel agents much distress. For
example, Microsoft's MSN Expedia is one among a group of Web-based travel
agencies that are furious over the airlines' own aggressive online ticket sales and
the slim commissions they pay online agencies. The group contends that the
airlines' practices are keeping most travel agents off the Web and making busi-
ness untenable for those who do venture online. That, in turn, could eventually
drive up fares for consumers by limiting choice. The travel agency associations
have filed complaints asking that the U.S. government investigate the airlines. At
stake is $29.4 billion that may be paid by online consumers for airline tickets and
other travel products in 2003.
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line. Would this then make the passenger's desk the "place of
business through which the contract has been made"? It could
be argued that the airline comes to the customer for the pur-
poses of selling tickets rather than the customer going to the
airline to buy tickets; therefore, the place of business can be said
to change also.
The most rational alternative to the passenger's location
would be the place where the airline's host server is located,
since the passenger contacts this place by electronic means, and
this is also the place where the input made by the passenger is
stored.1 58
In weighing these two alternatives, there does not seem be a
correct answer: both alternatives can be supported on purely
technical arguments. As these technical arguments are taken
into account, the examination below is extended to additional
factors. Taken altogether, the arguments supporting the pas-
senger's location at the time he/she has access to the airline's
web page clearly prevail over the airline server's location.
1. Purposes of the Convention and the Jurisdictional Provision
When the Convention was drafted almost exactly seventy years
ago, commercial aviation was in its infancy and international avi-
ation was truly embryonic. With only limited technology avail-
able, the margin of safety for international air travel was
disconcerting. The problem facing most international air carri-
ers at that time was the securing of capital in the face of what
appeared to be enormous hazards and risks. In the absence of a
limitation on liability, one disaster might have swept away a large
capital investment. Hence, "in order to provide a more
favorable environment for the industry's growth, the various
[countries] agreed to create a uniform body of law governing
the rights and liabilities of passengers and air carriers in interna-
tional air transportation. ' 159 The Convention sought to provide
158 In addition, the location of the passenger's host server is another option.
In most cases it would be the same place as the first alternative above. Adopting
the location of the server as a basis for jurisdiction would prevent haphazard
locations from being an alternative by "anchoring" the passenger to his/her
server, which would usually be in or somewhere close to the domicile of the pas-
senger. It must be noted that accessing the Internet is possible from a variety of
places that are intended for public use (for example, in libraries, universities, and
so-called "cyber cafes"). Therefore, the place of the passenger's server is not a
viable alternative.
159 Dunn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 589 F.2d 408, 410-11 (9th Cir. 1979).
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a uniform procedure, documentation, and regime of substantive
law applicable to claims arising out of international air transport
irrespective of the domicile of the passenger or carrier, the
place of injury, or the venue of trial.160 The drafters also per-
ceived a need to protect the carriers economically and provide a
more favorable environment for the industry's growth, as the
damage awards from a single air disaster could ruin an emerg-
ing airline. Thus, the primary purpose of the Convention was to
limit the liability in order to foster the growth of the fledging
commercial airline industry.161
This is no longer true. Most of the world's airline companies
are prosperous corporations with well-developed risk manage-
ment systems and insurance policies that are almost certain to
prevent an airline from being ruined by the damages it has to
pay due to an air disaster.'62 Although the initial primary pur-
pose of the Convention has probably not been completely lost,
its importance has diminished significantly in favor of other pur-
poses, such as the protection of the passenger. The focus and
interpretation of the Convention must be shifted correspond-
ingly. Although some writers have wondered whether the con-
cept of consumer protection has gone too far,163 it is still fair to
say that the airline is in a far better position than individual pas-
sengers to arrange adequate insurance and manage the risks as-
sociated with international air travel. It is also in a commercially
more advantageous position to insure (price and otherwise)
than the passenger; it has better information about the flight
(i.e., the insurance company can better assess the risk) than the
passenger; and it has the needed incentive to take the best possi-
ble steps to avoid the risks.
Since the choice of forum is vested in the plaintiff, there is a
presumption that Article 28 aims at protecting his/her interests.
160 See In re Air Disaster in Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 928 F.2d
1267, 1270 (2d Cir. 1991).
161 See Dunn v. Trans World Airlines, 589 F.2d at 410-11.
162 Preventing the long-lasting stain on the airline's reputation caused by an
accident, however, might prove to be crucial to an airline's commercial success.
163 See Andreas Kadletz, Passenger Domicile as a Relevant Point of Contact: An Obitu-
aty of Uniform Private International Law, 22:1 ANNALS OF AiR AND SPACE LAW 217,
226 (1997) (arguing that: (1) passenger treatment in cases of damages should
vary among the airlines, as vary the different benefits such as frequent flier
awards and on-board services; (2) the passenger should not be seen as an individ-
ual totally unable to arrange his own risk management strategies; and (3) that
American passengers do not deserve the protection of American law if the flight
has no connections to the U.S.)
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It has been suggested that this was done in order to make up for
the liability limits. 164  However, in addition to the factors
presented above, it must be noted that with the International
Air Transport Association (IATA) endorsing a contract to waive
the Convention's liability limits altogether, this reasoning has
lost its basis. The vast majority of U.S. and foreign airlines that
operate internationally have agreed to the new liability sys-
tem.165 Notwithstanding this, it remains a fact that the jurisdic-
tional freedom of choice has been given to the passenger, and
that this right defacto protects his/her interests. 166 Holding the
place where the passenger enters the data as the place "through
which the contract has been made" would further that goal,
since it would enable the passenger to gain access to courts with
which he/she is most familiar.
2. Passenger's Knowledge
Unlike in a situation in which the tickets are purchased by
calling the airline, the passenger has no knowledge of the geo-
graphical location of the airline's server at the time he accesses
the site. Internet protocols were designed to ignore rather than
document geographic location. While computers on the net-
work do have "addresses," they are logical addresses rather than
geographical addresses in real space. 167 The majority of In-
ternet addresses contain no geographic clues, and even where
an Internet address provides such a clue, it may be misleading.
164 GIEMULLA ET AL., supra note 6.
165 See Warren L. Dean, Jr., A New Warsaw Convention, LPBA Journal, Spring
1999, at 36. As of February 16, 1999, there were 120 U.S. and foreign carriers
signatory to the IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability. In the New
Convention, the liability limits concerning death or injury of the passenger have
been waived altogether. Article 21 of the New Convention reads: "1. For damages
arising under paragraph 1 of Article 17 not exceeding 100 000 Special Drawing
Rights for each passenger, the carrier shall not be able to exclude or limit its
liability. 2. The carrier shall not liable for damages arising under paragraph 1 of
Article 17 to the extent that they exceed for each passenger 100 000 Special
Drawing Rights if the carrier proves that: (a) such damage was not due to the
negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the carrier or its servants or
agents; or (b) such damage was solely due to the negligence or other wrongful
act or omission of a third party."
166 However, plaintiffs option has been held to be limited by a carrier's suc-
cessful forum non conveniens motion. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orle-
ans, Louisiana onJuly 9, 1982, 821 F.2d 1147, 1162 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that
a forum non conveniens dismissal is not inconsistent with Article 28 of the Conven-
tion notwithstanding that it denies the passenger his/her option.)
167 See American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 165 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
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With the Internet being border blind, situations could arise
where the plaintiff's option under Article 28(1) jurisdiction
would be to sue in a foreign country with which he has no con-
tacts whatsoever. Furthermore, it could be difficult for the
plaintiff to discover the geographic location where the airline's
server is located.
In addition to being a plaintiff-friendly provision (by vesting
the choice of jurisdiction with the plaintiff), Article 28 is also an
expression of the need for reliability, since Article 28(1) and
Article 32168 require that the action be brought within one of
the jurisdictions listed. Ajurisdiction without any connection to
the passenger, or any other connection to the airline than its
server's location would undermine these principles.
3. Discussion on Fiflh Jurisdiction
The recent proposals about adding a fifth jurisdiction (by any
of the means referred to in paragraph I, supra) speak for adopt-
ing an interpretation that would, in the case under considera-
tion, hold for the place where the site was accessed, i.e., the
passenger's domicile in most cases.169 As the number of tickets
purchased through the Internet rapidly increases, this interpre-
tation would eventually alleviate the need to take measures to-
wards adopting the fifth jurisdiction. Moreover, to the extent
that passengers are moved to sue in the courts of their own dom-
iciles instead of hiring U.S. lawyers and forum shopping in U.S.
courts, the interpretation will help to remedy that single greatest
criticism of the current Warsaw Convention system. 170
The fifth jurisdiction failed to be adopted in the European
Union legislation concerning air carrier liability in the event of
168 Article 32 of the Convention reads, "[a]ny clause contained in the contract
and all special agreements entered into before the damage occurred by which
the parties purport to infringe the rules laid down by this Convention, whether
by deciding the law to be applied, or by altering the rules as to jurisdiction, shall
be null and void." Warsaw Convention supra note 3.
169 Although the Internet makes it possible to buy tickets anywhere, presuma-
bly, in most cases, this would happen from the place where the passenger is per-
manently or ordinarily resident.
170 See Mendelsohn, supra note 14, at 185. This interpretation will solve juris-
dictional difficulties in the Eck context, but it will still not completely solve the
problem of the "wandering American" i.e., the notion that passengers (or their
survivors) should be able to sue in the passenger's domicile or place of perma-
nent residence. As Mendelsohn states, to argue that the fifth forum clause is only
for the "wandering American" ignores the fact that such a clause will benefit
passengers or their survivors in every country. Id.
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accidents because it was "deemed to raise very complex legal
and factual issues which would have to be resolved before set-
fling the claim."' 17' Besides partly alleviating the need to adopt a
provision allowing the fifth jurisdiction, the adoption of the rec-
ommended interpretation would also be the "easy way out" i.e.,
the complex legal and factual issues-whatever they might be in
each case-would not have to be resolved.
In discussing the adoption of a fifth jurisdiction, Professor Al-
lan I. Mendelsohn has suggested that a combination of in-
creased Piper Aircraft v. Reyn0172-inspired forum non conveniens
dismissals and a widened Article 28 should create a climate that
will "work to streamline and expedite the Warsaw settlement
process well before most cases are even filed. ' 173 By this he
means that whenever U.S. carriers would seek forum non con-
veniens dismissal against a foreign passenger's suit, the court
should be able to dismiss the case on the basis that the plaintiff
could have originally been able to sue in his home forum. 174
Again, the wide interpretation of the third jurisdiction under
Article 28 (1) works the same way. The forum non conveniens doc-
trine could "more clearly" be used in Internet-related cases in
which the plaintiff could have sued in his place of permanent
residence, but has chosen to go "forum-shopping" to more
favorable waters. The wide interpretation would therefore help
plaintiffs receive fair and quick compensation, whether or not
they decide to behave opportunistically.
4. Recent Developments in Jurisdictional Analysis of the Internet
As discussed in Part IV, courts in the U.S. in cases involving
Article 28(1) have turned to the doctrine of traditional personal
jurisdiction to draw on the tools developed there. It is likely,
171 Common Position (EC) No 16/97 (see Official journal NO. C 123, 21/04/
1997). Some writers have suggested that the reason behind the council's refusal
to add the fifth jurisdiction was probably the fact that IATA was only with great
difficulty, able to counter a similar demand on the part of the United States in
the context of the negotiations on the IATA Intercarrier Agreement. See Elmar
Giemulla and Ronald Schmid, Council Regulation (EC) No. 2027/97 on Air Carrier
Liability in the Event of Accidents and its implications for Air Carriers, 23 AIR & SPACE
LAw 98, 101 (1998).
172 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
173 Allan I. Mendelsohn, Domicile and the Warsaw System, 22:1 ANNALS OF AIR AND
SPACE LAW 137, 140-141 (1997).
174 Mendelsohn also adds that it would by no means be sure that comparable
relief would be granted to a foreign carrier that would not have adopted the fifth
forum. See id.
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therefore, that a court that has to solve a scheme involving a
ticket purchase through the Internet would turn to cases involv-
ing jurisdictional issues on the Internet and use similar tests and
concepts in deciding the case. Even if this would not be the
case, the application of the cyberspace jurisdiction doctrine will
at least function as a supporting argument in a situation where
the rules of the Warsaw Convention are deficient and fail to pro-
vide a definitive answer.
Pursuant to the purposeful availment prong found in the
leading cyberspace jurisdiction cases,' 75 the likelihood that per-
sonal jurisdiction will be exercised is directly proportionate to
the nature and quality of the commercial activity that an entity
conducts over the Internet. At one end of the scale is a passive
website that does little more than make information available to
those who are interested in it. At the other end, the defendant
is clearly doing business over the Internet. There is also a mid-
dle ground, which is occupied by interactive websites where a
user can exchange information with the host computer. In
these cases, the exercise ofjurisdiction is determined by examin-
ing the level of interactivity and the commercial nature of the
exchange of information that occurs on the website. 176 Airlines
are clearly at the "active," commercial end of the scale as the
commercial transaction of ticket purchases can be initiated and
concluded through the Internet.
The second prong is that the claim asserted in the litigation
"arises out of" the defendant's forum-related activities. As seen
in Part IV.B.2., the application of this test is somewhat problem-
atic in a contract-related situation. To date, this test has not
been applied in a purely contract-related cyberspace case. How-
ever, Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines177 provides us with some
guidelines. As seen above, the court of appeals' decision in that
case suggests that the damage can "arise out of" defendant's
contacts with the forum, because the defendant's solicitation of
business attracted the plaintiff (through their travel agent) to
the defendant. In the absence of defendant's activity, the plain-
tiff would not have taken the trip, and plaintiffs injury would
not have occurred. Similarly, in our case it can be said that the
airline's solicitation of business over the Internet attracts the
175 See supra Part IV B.1.
176 See e.g., Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
177 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990).
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passengers, and brings the potential litigation parties within
"tortious striking distance" of one another.
The third prong presents seven factors in light of which the
reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction should be evaluated.
The effect of the factors'7 8 in each case depends on the circum-
stances and nature of the case. A hypothetical application is not
carried out here. An application in a case can be found in
Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen.179
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, it can be said that by setting up an "active" web
page 180 the airline accepts the risk181 of being sued literally any-
where in the world regardless of the presence of an "actual" or
"concrete" ticket office. Although this might seem to be a harsh
result, it comports with the general features of Internet jurisdic-
tion laid out in paragraph IV supra, and is the "cyber-reality"
with which companies in other areas of business activities must
live. Furthermore, an airline's Internet page is defacto a ticket-
ing and booking office, which the language used in Eck requires
in order for the plaintiffs to be able to maintain suits. 18 2 As it is
impossible to know for sure where the airline's server is located,
178 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
179 141 F.3d 1316, 1322-1324 (9th Cir 1998). (Plaintiff Panavision accused de-
fendant Toeppen of being a "cyber pirate" who steals valuable trademarks and
establishes domain names on the Internet using these trademarks to sell the do-
main names to the rightful trademark owners. The court found that under the
"effects doctrine," Toeppen was subject to personal jurisdiction in California, be-
cause Toeppen did considerably more than simply register Panavision's trade-
marks as his domain names on the Internet. He registered those names as part of
a scheme to obtain money from Panavision. Pursuant to that scheme, he de-
manded $13,000 from Panavision to release the domain names to it. The court
held that his acts were aimed at Panavision in California, and caused it to suffer
injury there. In balancing the seven factors, the court concluded that although
some of the factors weighed in defendant's favor, the defendant failed to present
a compelling case that the court's exercise of jurisdiction in California would be
unreasonable).
180 Through which the contract can actually be completed and which is not set
up merely for promotional purposes.
181 At least the U.S. doctrine would seem to render this possibility to be a con-
crete one.
182 360 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1966). "This provision clearly manifests the framers
intention to permit ... the maintenance of a suit in the courts of the country
where the ticket was purchased. It is equally clear that another purpose of this
provision is to prevent the maintenance of suit in the courts of the country where
the ticket was purchased if the airline has no ticketing and booking office there."
Id. at 813.
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and since the contract is concluded by the passenger at the loca-
tion where he/she is at the time of access to the airline's web
site, it is logical to hold that this is in fact the place of business
through which the contract is made. This interpretation is also
in line with on-going discussions about the fifth jurisdiction and
automatically moves the Convention in a desirable direction. It
will be interesting to see if the airline industry becomes more
receptive to a full fifth jurisdiction provision (encompassing the
wandering American as well as the wandering citizens of any
other nationality) once it realizes that the more airlines use the
Internet for sales, the more they subject themselves to suit
worldwide. The New Convention signed at Montreal on May,
1999, would seem to prove that the industry is receptive and ca-
pable of change. However, in this case the receptiveness proba-
bly took place for reasons other than the effects of the Internet.
The airline industry is no longer in its birth stages. It no
longer needs the special protection accorded by the framers of
the Warsaw Convention. As a strong, competitive industry,
there is no reason why it should be able to hide behind the Con-
vention and enjoy the benefits of modern technology without
the challenges, while entrepreneurs in other forms of transpor-
tation must face the challenges that modern technology
presents. 183
B. TICKETS ARE PURCHASED THROUGH AN AGENT'S
INTERNET SITE
As discussed above, most countries-the exception most nota-
bly being France-hold that at least an IATA-Agency may also be
considered a carrier's place of business. This broad interpreta-
183 See Lyck and Dornic, Electronic Ticketing under the Warsaw Convention: The Risk
of 'Going Ticketless' on International Flights, 22 AIR AND SPACE LAW 13, 26 (1997).
Peter Lyck and Benjamin A. Dornic have come to the same conclusion in their
article on electronic ticketing. Lyck and Dornic choose the passenger's location
at the time he/she has access to the airline's homepage (as opposed to the air-
line's host server), because:
1) Passengers traveling on foreign airlines should not end up bringing a
suit in a country with which they have no contacts;
2) The choice of forum is vested with the plaintiff and the Article presum-
ably aims at protecting their interests;
3) The carrier has agreed to do business through the Internet, and thus,
everywhere in the world, and hence it must accept being drawn into
the courts of the domicile of the passenger; and
4) Selecting the passenger's location is consistent with the current regula-
tory proposals advanced by independent commentators and govern-
mental bodies (meaning the discussion on the "fifth jurisdiction").
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tion complies with the purpose of the Article and permits the
suit to be brought at the place that is "closely related to the sale
of the ticket i.e., where the 'contract has been made." 4 Fur-
thermore, it is up to the carrier to have its tickets sold either
through its own company or by an agent. Having established
this, the question about the place of business where the contract
has been made through a travel agent's Internet site still
remains.
Today, two types of agents can be found in the Internet: tradi-
tional travel agents, that have set up web pages, and travel
agents that are purely Internet-based (i.e., which lack a "physi-
cal" office in which the customers could visit).'8 5 As there is no
difference other than the lack of a "physical presence" (which is
not relevant in our case anyway), the term "travel agent" is used
generally in the following analysis and is meant to cover both
types of agents.
Without further consideration, all of the factors-the purpose
of the convention, the uncertainty of the actual geographical
location, the jurisdictional analysis concerning cyberspace, and
the current trend towards adopting a fifth jurisdiction-advo-
cate the same result when the ticket is bought directly from the
airline's web page, and for the same reasons. Therefore, Article
28(1)'s place of business would be the passenger's location at
the time he/she has access to the travel agent's web page.
A final question remains: whether the carrier must have an
actual presence in the territory where the travel agent's Internet
sale was made in order to be subject to jurisdiction there? This
question does not present itself where the Internet sale/
purchase is made on the carrier's own web site, as that site is
itself an actual presence. Eck, however, would seem to require
some actual presence. But Eck, as previously discussed (para-
graph II, C 1), is primarily an exception to the rule in Berner,
which reflects the kind of relationship that exists in most cases
between the carrier and the travel agent. Therefore, when the
purchase of the ticket has been made through a travel agent's
website, the presence of the actual carrier in the relevant terri-
184 Berner v. United Airlines, 3 A.D.2d 9, 12 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956).
185 Purely Internet-based travel agencies are eligible for an IATA/IATAN en-
dorsement as long as they meet all the normal requirements. See Arofret c. St6.
Capitol Int'l, 1985 RFDA 213 (Trib. Comm. Paris, 1983). Telephone interview
with Janet Bedard, IATAN's endorsement department (June 23, 1999). So far,
there are no purely Internet based agencies that have an IATAN endorsement.
See id.
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tory should not be required in order to find jurisdiction over the
carrier. If, for example, a person is in Oakland, California,
when accessing an agent's website to book a flight between Jeru-
salem and Cairo on UAA 186 (and both the agent and its server
are located, e.g., in Canada), the place of business is the passen-
ger's location in Oakland, and UAA could be sued there even if
it were not present in the U.S. territory. The result of the analy-
sis is thus the same as is in the case where the Internet site of the
airline itself is accessed.
The theoretical issue of what might occur if the airline does
not operate in a particular country and otherwise has no assets
there, and hence, does not appear to defend itself, is beyond the
scope of this paper.
VII. CONCLUSION
Every aviation country in the world faces the same dilemma:
either the Convention must be updated to withstand the chal-
lenges of recent technological and other developments, or the
courts in various member countries will be forced to reform the
Convention unilaterally by judicial decisions. In the former al-
ternative an agreement must be found to overcome many polit-
ical and economic conflicts that persist among the Warsaw
parties. If the latter option is chosen, it is likely that the text of
the Convention will give rise to different lines of court-made de-
cisions throughout the major commercial aviation countries-as
is the situation today.
Increased litigation under the Convention is inevitable as air
travel expands exponentially into the new century, although all
of us should hope this will not be the case. If accidents do oc-
cur, most of these cases would be governed by the Convention.
It is ironic that the cause of the problem is also the factor that is
likely to increase difficulties: an increasing number of people
are buying their tickets online (and airline companies are ac-
tively encouraging this behavior by offering, e.g., weekly web
sales). This means, that in the case of an accident the interpre-
tation of one of the jurisdictions under Article 28(1) is more
than unclear.
The solution suggested in this paper is practical in that it
takes into account the technical characteristics of the Internet.
So far the technology does not allow the user to be sure of the
186 A "modified" Eck situation.
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geographical location of the server he/she is accessing. This be-
ing the case, it would further the goal of protecting the passen-
ger's interest to hold that the place of business is actually the
passenger's location at the time the Internet is accessed. Fur-
thermore, the solution would take the Convention a step closer
to the desired "fifth forum," and would also be consistent with
the recent developments in the area of cyberspace law. Under
these circumstances, little room remains for a formalistic view
that would strictly follow the language of the convention. After
all, a strict interpretation would take the Convention a large step
backwards at the very time when a dynamic step forward is
needed to take us into the new millenium.
